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Abstract  
Several devices in designing composite indicators for policy monitoring and benchmarking are 
discussed: weighting and scaling of variables, hierarchical organization, handling rank-based 
variables, relief tables, survey simulation techniques which combine normative and empirical 
data. Some remarks are made on survey design to facilitate constructing composite indicators. 
Keywords  
Composite indicators, methodology of policy monitoring and benchmarking, hierarchy of indices, 
scaling, rank-based variables, relief tables, survey design, working conditions. 
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What is not quantified is ignored. 
Business rule 
 
Measure what is measurable and make measurable what is not so. 
Galileo (1564–1642) 
Introduction 
For the first time, the quality of jobs was officially specified through the 2001 Laeken indicators 
[European Commission 2001, 2002, 2008] in response to the 2000 Lisbon summit’s claim for 
‘more and better jobs’. ‘More jobs’ was well measurable, but ‘better jobs’ looked hardly 
quatifiable, and it was proposed to monitor it by the number of accidents at work. The adequacy 
of this indicator is rather conditional; for instance, football professionals are constantly exposed 
to ‘accidents at work’, but nobody would doubt that they have dream jobs. However, the 
European Commission found no better solution, even having disposed detailed European 
Working Conditions Surveys (EWCS) carried out since 1995 by the European Foundation for 
Living and Working Conditions (called usually European Foundation) assisted by national 
statistical offices. 
Such a gap between the general formulation of policies and their fragmental statistical 
representations is quite usual. During the last two decades, this gap is filled in with aggregate 
composite indicators, or summary indices, which 1–1 link policy targeting and policy wordings. 
One of early examples is the Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) indicator introduced by 
[OECD 1999] to monitor labour flexibilization; for its regular updates see [OECD.Stats 2018]. 
Methodological foundations of composite indicators are described in the handbook [OECD 
2008], and [European Parliament 2009] has reviewed about 20 approaches to measuring the job 
quality, in particular, using composite indicators. 
In spite of propagation of composite indicators, they are often too thoughtlessly constructed, too 
literally interpreted or, alternatively, too severely mistrusted. In this paper we summarize our 
experiences in handling composite indicators and their derivation from working conditions 
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surveys; see [Tangian 2011] for more details and references to technical reports. The main 
conclusion is that composite indicators can be very useful for policy monitoring and 
benchmarking but they need special treatment and the surveys have to be designed appropriately 
to facilitate their construction. 
Justification of Composite Indicators  
A composite indicator is a function f in n statistical variables (formula with n entries) which to 
each set of input values x1, …, xn puts into correspondence the indicator value y =  f(x1, …, xn) . 
A composite indicator is not expected to abruptly change its behaviour, meaning differentiability 
of f . Then its Taylor expansion in a neighbourhood of reference point (x
0
1, …, x
0
n) gives the first-
order approximation of  f : 
1
0 0
10 0 0
1 1
1
0 0 0 0
1 10 0 0
1
1 1
Constant  
Weighted sum 
( )
n
j
n
n
n n j j
jj
n n
n n
n j j
j jj i
C
j j
f x … x
f x … x f x … x x x
x
f x … x f x … x
f x … x x x
x x
a x
C

 
 
    
   
   

   
   
    
 
 
 
  
      

     
    
 

 

 
1
n
j j
j
a x


 
Since composite indicators are primarily used for monitoring relative progress and 
benchmarking, the constant C is omitted. Hence, the remaining weighted sum of variables is the 
composite indicator to within its first-order approximation. The signs of coefficients aj (which are 
often just ±1s) are coordinated to indicate the overall improvement either by the indicator’s 
increase, as in the case of job quality, or decrease, as in the case of disability risks. 
Weighting of variables is made explicitly by attributing weight coefficients aj , or implicitly, 
either due to a hierarchy of indicators or by scaling. As for explicit weighting, ‘most composite 
indicators rely on equal weighting, i.e., all variables are given the same weight’ [OECD 2008, p. 
31]. If no information is available, equal weights have maximal statistical likelihood [Kendall and 
Moran 1963]. Another reason for equal weighting is that if certain variables have higher weights 
then the persons for whom these variables are important are overrepresented. For instance, 
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women with children can be most interested in most generously paid maternity leave, and single 
men in long unemployment insurance. Therefore, a higher weight for paid maternity leave 
favours women with children and discriminates single men. It means that unequal weights of 
variables result in inequality of some individuals. Since individuals are usually assumed equal, 
regardless of education, experience, or intelligence (in line with the principle ‘one voter—one 
vote’), the weights of variables are assumed equal as well.  
Unequal weights are explicitly applied if the relative importance of factors is known, which is 
quite seldom. On the other hand, there are surveys in which the interviewed are asked for their 
subjective weighting; see the Gute-Arbeit (Good Work) index of [DGB 2007, 2009]. It should be 
however noted that statistical variables are often correlated, which reduces the effect of their 
unequal weighting. For more advanced methods of constructing composite indicators as objective 
functions, which measure the degree of attainment of policy targets, see [Tangian and Gruber 
2002]. 
Weighting in Hierarchical Composite Indicators 
A composite indicator is hierarchical if it is a sum of several composite (sub-)indicators. For 
example, the DGB indicator Gute Arbeit is a sum of three equally weighted sub-indicators: 
resources (work organization) based on ten composite sub-sub-indicators, strains based on three 
composite sub-sub-indicators, and stability and income based on two composite sub-sub-
indicators — each summarizing unequal numbers of variables. Such a hierarchy implicitly leads 
to the unequal weighting of variables. To illustrate this, let us consider the average of two 
composite indicators, the first one being the average of three and the second — of two statistical 
variables:  
𝑓(𝑥1, … , 𝑥5) =
𝑥1+𝑥2+𝑥3
3
 + 
𝑥4+𝑥5
2
2
 . 
Then the effective weights of  x1, x2, x3  are  1/3 × 1/2 = 1/6, and the effective weights of  x4,  x5  
are 1/2×1/2 = 1/4. 
The uncontrollable implicit weighting in hierarchical composite indicators can lead to 
inconsistencies. For instance, the EPL indicator of the OECD is a sum of three indicators: EPL 
for regular employment, EPL for temporary employment and EPL for collective dismissals. Since 
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they are defined independently with different number of variables, the temporary employed in 
Belgium, France, Italy, Norway and Spain look better protected than the permanently employed 
which is an evident contradiction; see Table 1. 
Table 1. OECD indicators of strictness of employment protection legislation (EPL) 
 Regular employment Temporary employment Collective dismissals 
 Late 
1980s 
Late 
1990s 
2003 Late 
1980s 
Late 
1990s 
2003 Late 
1990s 
2003 
Austria 2.9 2.9 2.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 3.3 3.3 
Belgium 1.7 1.7 1.7 4.6 2.6 2.6 4.1 4.1 
Czech 
Republic 
… 3.3 3.3 … 0.5 0.5 2.1 2.1 
Denmark 1.5 1.5 1.5 3.1 1.4 1.4 3.9 3.9 
Finland 2.8 2.3 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.6 2.6 
France 2.3 2.3 2.5 3.1 3.6 3.6 2.1 2.1 
Germany 2.6 2.7 2.7 3.8 2.3 1.8 3.5 3.8 
Italy 1.8 1.8 1.8 5.4 3.6 2.1 4.9 4.9 
Netherlands 3.1 3.1 3.1 2.4 1.2 1.2 3.0 3.0 
Norway 2.3 2.3 2.3 3.5 3.1 2.9 2.9 2.9 
Poland … 2.2 2.2 … 0.8 1.3 4.1 4.1 
Portugal 4.8 4.3 4.3 3.4 3.0 2.8 3.6 3.6 
Spain 3.9 2.6 2.6 3.8 3.3 3.5 3.1 3.1 
Sweden 2.9 2.9 2.9 4.1 1.6 1.6 4.5 4.5 
Switzerland 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 3.9 3.9 
United 
Kingdom 
0.9 0.9 1.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 2.9 2.9 
Source: [OECD 2004, p. 117] 
Scaling Variables for Composite Indicators 
Scaling is aimed at making statistical variables commensurable. For instance, yearly income in 
Euro and the type of contract (Permanent/Temporary) are not commensurable, since the type of 
contract coded by 1 and 0 becomes negligible compared with many thousand Euro. Therefore, 
the range of certain variables is reduced, of others — increased. The most used scaling methods 
are normalization and standardization [OECD 2008, pp. 84–85].  
Normalization reduces the range of variable 𝑥𝑗 with m records 𝑥𝑗 = (𝑥𝑗
1, … , 𝑥𝑗
𝑖 , … , 𝑥𝑗
𝑚) to the 
segment [0;1]: 
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𝑥𝑗  →  𝑦𝑗 =
𝑥𝑗 − min
𝑖
𝑥𝑗
𝑖
max
𝑖
𝑥𝑗
𝑖 − min
𝑖
𝑥𝑗
𝑖
 . 
Normalization is a linear transformation which preserves all ‘good properties’ of the variables . A 
composite indicator which consists of normalized variables is the weighted mean of the 
corresponding codes. It attains 0 or 1 if all the codes are lowest or highest, respectively. The 
simple interaction of variables makes normalized indicators transparent and practical. However, 
normalization is not appropriate for data with outliers (few large deviations from ‘typical’ 
values), because the typical values get clustered to give room for the outliers. Normalization 
works well if answers to questions are restricted to a few choices, because then there are no 
outliers. For instance, if income is given in absolute figures then a few top earners result in 
outliers and normalization is inappropriate; in this case income can be first given in deciles and 
only then normalized. 
Standardization, particularly promoted by the OECD, brings the mean of a variable to 0 
(reference), and the standard deviation to 1 (scale unit): 
𝑥𝑗  →  𝑦𝑗 =
𝑥𝑗 − 𝜇𝑗
𝜎𝑗
 , 
where 
𝜇𝑗 =
1
𝑚
∑ 𝑥𝑗
𝑖𝑚
𝑖=1                (mean) 
𝜎𝑗 = √
1
𝑚−1
∑ (𝑥𝑗
𝑖 − 𝜇𝑗)2
𝑚
𝑖=1     (standard deviation). 
Standardization does not cluster typical values even in the presence of outliers but, being a non-
linear transformation, results in some questionable effects. Under standardization, ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ values are relativized, which sometimes makes composite results counterintuitive. For 
example, let four individuals characterize their satisfaction with job security and income in % as 
shown in the upper section of Table 2. In the bottom section, these figures are standardized. As 
follows from the top section, all the individuals are better satisfied with their income than job 
stability, and Individual 1 is the second best satisfied with his job, having 169 points and 
approaching Individual 4. After standardization, Individuals 2 and 3 look better satisfied with 
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their job stability than income, and Individual 1 looks the least satisfied with his job, being far 
behind Individual 1. 
Table 2. Index of job satisfaction before and after standardization of variables 
 Satisfaction with job security 𝑥1 Satisfaction with income 𝑥2 Index 𝑓 = 𝑥1 + 𝑥2 
Individual 1 70   99 169 
Individual 2 50 100 150 
Individual 3 50 100 150 
Individual 4 70 100 170 
Mean 𝜇𝑗 60 99.75  
Std. dev. 𝜎𝑗 11.55  0.5  
 Standardization  𝑥1  →  𝑦1 Standardization  𝑥2  →  𝑦2 Index 𝑓 = 𝑦1 + 𝑦2 
Individual 1    0.87 –1.5 –0.63 
Individual 2 –0.87   0.5 –0.37 
Individual 3 –0.87   0.5   0.37 
Individual 4   0.87   0.5   1.37 
 
This non-monotonicity of composite indicators is well seen in Figure 1, where the precariousness 
of jobs in European countries is indexed using normalized and standardized variables and 
composite sub-indicators. In both charts, the countries are ordered by decreasing composite 
indices. The lengths of colour bars are proportional to the (composite) sub-indices, but in the 
right-hand chart the same constant is added to all the sub-indices to visualize their negative 
values. In the left-hand chart, the decreasing total length of the colour bars implies a monotonous 
decrease of the composite indicator, but not in the right-hand chart. For example, the total 
precariousness of jobs in Czech Republic (CZ) and Greece (EL) is estimated with 83 and 59 
points, respectively, whereas the Czech total bar is much shorter. The composite indicator’s non-
monotonicity in variables argues against their standardization in this type of applications.  
Method of Total Ranks for Non-Metrical Variables 
The OECD guidelines for constructing composite indicators assume that the input first-level 
indicators are all metrical statistical figures. It is not the case of qualitative issues, which can be 
only ranked. According to the OECD, the major problem of rank-based scales is the dependence 
of new alternatives:  
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Source: [Tangian 2011, p. 91–92] based on data [European Foundation 2007] 
Figure 1. Composite indicators of job precariousness in European countries 
 
One limitation of a summary indicator based on ranking is that a given country’s … score could 
either rise or fall over time, even though its … practice were completely unchanged, for the 
simple reason that other countries changed their policies. Even more fundamentally, it would be 
invalid to compare rank-based score for the late 1980s, which was based on an analysis of 16 
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European countries, with a rank-based score for the late 1990s based on a sample of 27 countries. 
Quite independently of any changes in EPL, the maximum rank score has nearly doubled.  
[OECD 1999, p. 115]. 
To illustrate this effect, let us consider the duration of unemployment insurance in 1994–2004 in 
Denmark and the Netherlands. In 1994, the duration of Danish insurance was 30 months, and of 
the Dutch 6–54 months, depending on the length of service and age. In 2004 Denmark extended 
the duration unconditionally to 48 months. Although the practice remained unchanged, the Dutch 
rank changes, implying the change of its rank-based score: 
Rank 1994 2004 
Country Insurance duration Country Insurance duration 
1 Netherlands 6–54 months, conditioned Denmark 48 months, unconditioned 
2 Denmark 30 months, unconditioned Netherlands 6–54 months, conditioned 
To overcome this effect, the ranking method is modified as follows. As items, we consider the 
pairs ‘Country/Year’, implying (Denmark 1994) and (Denmark 2004) to be two different items 
(as they actually are). Hence, we obtain the total ranks: 
Rank 1994 2004 
Country Insurance duration Country Insurance duration 
1   Denmark 48 months, unconditioned 
2 Netherlands 6–54 months, conditioned Netherlands 6–54 months, conditioned 
3 Denmark 30 months, unconditioned   
This device changes the Danish rank and keeps the Dutch rank invariable, surmounting the 
‘dependence on new alternatives’ of rank-based indicators.  
The second OECD’s concern is that the rank-based indicators are misleading when the number of 
countries changes (e.g. the top rank of 27 countries almost doubles the top rank of 16 countries). 
This problem is easily resolved by normalizing the ranks, e.g., by always reducing their range to 
0–1.  
Relief Tables 
Relief tables are practical to visualize and analyse composite indicators. For these purposes, the 
table cells are coloured like in geographical maps: high values are shown in brown — as 
mountains, the moderately positive in green — as plains, the moderately negative in pale blue — 
as shallow waters, and strongly negative ones in dark blue — as deep ocean.  
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The relief table in Figure 2 shows the composition of indicator ‘Total quality of work’ based on 
15 composite sub-sub-indicators, grouped into three sub-indicators as described in Section 
 
Source: [Tangian 2011, p. 108] based on the data from [European Foundation 2007] 
Figure 2. Composition of indicator ‘Total quality of work’ based on normalized variables 
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 ‘Weighting in Hierarchical Composite Indicators’. It prompts two observations of particular 
importance. Firstly, the level of professional training is <50 all over Europe (dark blue). Among 
15 aspects of working conditions considered, the first partial indicator Qualification and 
development possibilities gets the lowest evaluation — ‘bad’ in all European countries. This 
means that Europe is not yet really prepared to base its policy on lifelong learning. The second 
observation is that career chances all over Europe are quite poor, and income is but modest. The 
third column exhibits either ‘bad’ or ‘inferior’ evaluation of career chances in all countries except 
Denmark with 61 points. The income evaluation does not surpass the medium threshold either. 
This hardly meets the claims for ‘better jobs’ in the 2000 Lisbon Agenda. 
Survey Simulation 
Survey simulation is a technique of replacing a survey or its part with a computer model. The 
need for such a replacement emerges if there is no survey on the given topic, or if many persons 
cannot or do not wish to answer some questions. 
Sometimes the answers required can be derived from the personal situation. For instance, taxes 
and benefits of unemployed are determined by public officials using special computer programs. 
Such programs input the data on income, employment record, family status, etc., and output taxes 
and benefits. Therefore, the net replacement rates of unemployed can be derived from their 
personal data collected in the existing household surveys. Thus, quite reliable individual 
‘responses’ to problematic questions can be obtained by interfacing known normative formulas to 
empirical data from apparently irrelevant surveys.  
For instance, tax-benefit formulas with which taxes and benefits are computed by the [OECD 
2005] Tax-Benefit Models can be interfaced to the data of the Labour Force Survey of the 
Eurostat. This approach has been successively applied; see [Tangian 2011, Chapter 5]. 
The same approach helps to reveal the difference between the factual (empirical) and institutional 
(normative) situation at the labour market. For instance, according to the 2005 EWCS, Turkey 
has the highest labour flexibility among the 31 countries considered, but according to [OECD 
2004, p. 117] it has the most strict employment protection; see Table 3. This contradiction is 
explained as follows. The OECD indicator evaluates institutional norms, reflecting that the  
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Table 3. Institutional and factual employment insecurity; country ranks in columns are given after the 
slash 
 Institutional employment insecurity: 
Strictness of EPL as a weighted 
average of EPL indices for permanent 
employment, temporary employment 
and collective dismissals with the 
OECD weights 5/12, 5/12 and 2/12, 
respectively  
Factual employment insecurity derived from 
interfacing the institutional flexibility indices to the 
2005 EWCS data  
 Flexibility based on 
normalized variables 
Flexibility, 
based on 
standardized 
variables 
Employment 
with no 
contract 
OECD score 0–6 % % % 
United 
Kingdom 
0.7 / 1 27 / 6 56 / 6 15 / 6 
Ireland 1.1 / 2 33 / 5 101 / 5 25 / 5 
Switzerland 1.1 / 2 7 / 31 –77 / 30 4 / 20 
Denmark 1.4 / 3 13 / 13 –32 / 13 8 / 11 
Hungary 1.5 / 4 11 / 20 –50 / 19 4 / 18 
Poland 1.7 / 5 17 / 12 –11 / 12 6 / 13 
Czech 
Republic 
1.9 / 6 11 / 19 –50 / 20 2 / 27 
Italy 1.9 / 6 17 / 11 –10 / 11 9 / 8 
Austria 1.9 / 6 19 / 9 2 / 9 11 / 7 
Slovakia 1.9 / 6 9 / 25 –63 / 25 2 / 29 
Finland 2.0 / 7 11 / 18 –48 / 18 3 / 24 
Netherlands 2.1 / 8 9 / 23 –60 / 23 2 / 26 
Belgium 2.2 / 9 8 / 28 –70 / 28 3 / 23 
Germany 2.2 / 9 9 / 24 –61 / 24 3 / 21 
Sweden 2.2 / 9 9 / 27 –65 / 27 1 / 30 
Norway 2.6 / 10 7 / 29 –76 / 29 3 / 22 
Greece 2.8 / 11 41 / 4 148 / 4 32 / 4 
France 3.0 / 12 12 / 16 –42 / 16 5 / 16 
Spain 3.1 / 13 22 / 7 27 / 7 9 / 10 
Portugal 3.5 / 14 20 / 8 11 / 8 9 / 9 
Turkey 3.7 / 15 71 / 1 356 / 1 67 / 1 
Estonia … 13 / 14 –34 / 14 7 / 12 
Cyprus … 48 / 2 199 / 2 42 / 2 
Latvia … 10 / 21 –57 / 21 4 / 19 
Lithuania … 13 / 15 –35 / 15 5 / 15 
Luxemburg … 7 / 30 –78 / 31 1 / 31 
Malta … 46 / 3 184 / 3 41 / 3 
Slovenia … 9 / 26 –63 / 26 2 / 28 
Bulgaria … 19 / 10 2 / 10 6 / 14 
Croatia … 12 / 17 –45 / 17 2 / 25 
Romania … 9 / 22 –59 / 22 5 / 17 
Source: First column [OECD 2004, p. 117]; columns 2–4 [Tangian 2011, p. 94] based on [European Foundation 2007]. 
Turkish regulation of ‘hiring and firing’ is very strict. The EWCS 2005 reveals that 302 of 454 
Turkish employees interviewed have no contract at all, that is, 67% are not covered by labour 
protection, being employed in the most insecure way. A similar situation is inherent in Cyprus, 
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where 201 of 482 = 42% employees work with no contract, Malta (201 of 507 = 40%), and 
Greece (179 of 629 = 28%). To construct an ‘empirical’ indicator of employment insecurity, as 
opposed to the normative EPL indicator by the OECD, the EPL indices for permanent and 
temporary employment and 0 for the employees with no contract should be weighed, using as 
weights the percentages of the employees with permanent, temporary and no contract, 
respectively. 
Survey Design to Facilitate Constructing Composite Indicators for 
Monitoring Working Conditions 
Below we provide a kind of check-up for design of a survey aimed at constructing composite 
indicators of working conditions.   
Policy issues 
1. Relevance to particular policies to be monitored 
Are the objectives of the survey formulated explicitly? (Which policies are monitored: 
quality of jobs, non-precariousness, flexibility of employment, etc.) 
How exhaustive is the questionnaire regarding these policies? 
2. Target users  
Who are the target users of the data? (Policy makers, policy analysts, academics, trade 
unions, etc.)  
To which extent does the survey satisfy their needs? 
3. Definition of working conditions  
 Is the [ILO 1999] notion of decent work (with four pillars: income, employment stability, 
employability and integration in social security schemata, incl. pensions) taken into 
account? 
Which aspects do constitute the notion of working conditions? 
How these aspects are arranged into a hierarchy? 
Are all its levels labelled with titles? 
17 
 
Respectively, a hierarchical structure of the survey with titles and subtitles of ‘Chapters’ 
and ‘Sections’ associated with particular aspects of working conditions is very helpful. It 
could be used for constructing sub-indicators, sub-sub-indicators, etc.  
Conceptual issues 
4. Weighting questions by individuals 
It can make sense to ask individuals, how important for them is the given question?  
5. Tracing working histories  
It can make sense to accompany certain questions with an inquiry ‘What was the situation 
1, 2, 5, 10 years ago?’  
6. Tracing expectations (about income, job stability, career, mobility, etc.)  
It can make sense to accompany certain questions with an inquiry ‘What do you expect in 
1, 2, 5, 10 years?'  
Questions 
7. Avoiding misleading formulations 
Ambiguous questions like ‘Is your work emotionally demanding?’ should be explained 
with ‘in the positive sense’ or ‘in the negative sense’  
8. Dealing with ambiguous values  
Questions on some issues like ‘Are your working hours flexible?’ should be accompanied 
by an inquiry ‘Do you appreciate it?’, because the given issue can be good for ones and 
bad for others. 
9. Asking for absolute and harmonized figures 
It is practical to have, for instance, income both in harmonized units (A, B, C,…) and 
absolute figures (to compute the average, median, inequality in payment, gender gap, etc.) 
Answers and their coding 
10. Unification of codes 
To avoid re-coding while constructing composite indicators, ‘bad’ issues have to be coded 
by smaller numbers, and ‘good’ by larger numbers. Mediocre issues should be coded by 
18 
 
intermediate numbers. Instead of coding like 1 – bad, 2 – good, 3 – neither bad nor good, 
it is better to apply coding like 1 – bad, 2 – neither bad nor good, 3 – good. 
11. Avoiding branching in questions and answers  
Instead of 'Do you work shifts?' If yes – go to the next question (Do your work night 
shifts, do you work day shifts,…) make one question: 'Do you work: no shifts (5), rotating 
shifts (4), morning shifts (3), afternoon shifts (2), night shifts (1)' 
Sampling 
12. Size of samples  
From the standpoint of mathematical statistics, the representativeness of a sample depends 
on its size but not on the size of the total population. To guarantee the same 
representativeness of regional samples, samples from small regions must be of the same 
size as that from large ones.  
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